Labor Law Case Digest: HSBC v. NLRC, et al [G.R. No. 116542. July 30, 1996]

HSBC v. NLRC [G.R. No. 116542. July 30, 1996]

Facts:

Complainant is a regular rank and file employee of  HSBC in Makati City. It appears that on February 3, 1993, complainant called the bank to inform the latter that he had an upset stomach and would not be able to report for work. His superior, however, requested him to report for work because the department he was then in was undermanned but complainant insisted that it was impossible for him to report for work, hence, he was allowed to go on sick leave on that day.

On February 4, 1993 the bank called up Dr. Logos to verify the truth of complainants statement but the doctor denied that he examined or attended to complainant on February 3, 1993 and the last time complainant consulted him was in December 1992. For this reason, the bank directed complainant to explain his acts of dishonesty because allegedly he was not honest in telling the bank that he had an upset stomach on February 3, 1993, and that he consulted Dr. Logos on that day.

Complainant, in his written statement, further admitted that his statement about his not staying at his house for one week and his consulting a doctor was incorrect, but that the same was not given with malicious intention or deceit or meant to commit fraud against the bank, its operations, customers and employees. 

However, on February 16, 1993, the bank came out with a memorandum terminating his services effective March 16, 1993 pursuant to Article 13, Section VI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the union of the rank and file employees of the bank and the company and the banks Code of Conduct.

Petitioner insists that private respondent should be dismissed in accordance with rules contained in its employees handbook stating that any form of dishonesty shall constitute serious offenses calling for termination.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not private respondents act of making a false statement as to the real reason for his absence on did not constitute such dishonesty as would warrant his termination from service.

(2) Whether or not NLRC arbitrarily imposed its value judgment and standard on petitioners disciplinary rules, thereby unilaterally restricting the Banks power and prerogative to discipline its employees according to reasonable rules and regulations

Held:

(1) YES. It is unarguable that private respondents false information concerning his whereabouts on February 3, 1993 is not a fraud, nor a false entry in the books of the bank; neither is it a failure to turn over clients funds, or theft or use of company assets, or anything analogous as to constitute a serious offense meriting the extreme penalty of dismissal.

Under Art. 282 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

None of the above apply in the instant case. To be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.

(2)  NO. It is the NLRC's right and duty to review employers exercise of their prerogative to dismiss so as to prevent abuse and arbitrariness as granted under Arts. 217 and 218 of the Labor Code. The employers prerogative and power to discipline and terminate an employees services may not be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner as to erode or render meaningless the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and due process. Our labor laws, both substantive and procedural, require strict compliance before an employee may be dismissed.

Petition DISMISSED.

Labor Law Digest: PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX CORPORATION, et al v. NLRC et al [G.R. No. 111501. March 5, 1996]

PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX CORPORATION, et al v. NLRC et al 
[G.R. No. 111501. March 5, 1996]

Facts:
Fuji Xerox entered into an agreement under which Skillpower, Inc. supplied workers to operate copier machines of Fuji Xerox as part of the latters Xerox Copier Project in its sales offices. Private respondent Pedro Garado was assigned as key operator at Fuji Xerox branch at Buendia, Makati  in February of 1980.

In February of 1983, Garado went on leave and his place was taken over by a substitute. Upon his return in March, he discovered that there was a spoilage of over 600 copies. Afraid that he might be blamed for the spoilage, he tried to talk to a service technician of Fuji Xerox into stopping the meter of the machine.

The technician refused Garados request, but this incident came to the knowledge of Fuji Xerox which, on May 31, 1983, reported the matter to Skillpower, Inc. The next day, Skillpower, Inc. wrote Garado, ordering him to explain. In the meantime, it suspended him from work. Garado filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter held in a decision rendered on October 30, 1986 that Garado was an employee of Skillpower, Inc., and that he had merely been assigned by Skillpower, Inc. to Fuji Xerox. Hence, the dismissal.

On the other hand, the NLRC found Garado to be in fact an employee of petitioner Fuji Xerox and by it to have been illegally dismissed.

Hence the present petition. Fuji Xerox argues that Skillpower, Inc. is an independent contractor and that Garado is its employee for the following reasons:

(1) Garado was recruited by Skillpower, Inc.;

(2) The work done by Garado was not necessary to the conduct of the business of Fuji Xerox;

(3) Garados salaries and benefits were paid directly by Skillpower, Inc.;

(4) Garado worked under the control of Skillpower, Inc.; and

(5) Skillpower, Inc. is a highly-capitalized business venture.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Skillpower Inc. is an independent contractor and Garado was its employee?

HELD:
NO. Skillpower is a labor-only contractor and Garado is not its employee, based on the following findings:

(1) Garado was recruited by Skillpower, Inc. solely for assignment to Fuji Xerox to work in the latters Xerox Copier Project. When Garado was first assigned to work at Fuji Xerox, he had never been assigned to any other company so much so that by 1984, he was already a member of the union which petitioned the company for his regularization.

(2) The Xerox Copier Project of petitioners promotes goodwill for the company. It may not generate income for the company but there are activities which a company may find necessary to engage in because they ultimately redound to its benefit. Operating the company's copiers at its branches advertises the quality of their products and promotes the company's reputation and public image. It also advertises the utility and convenience of having a copier machine. It is noteworthy that while not operated for profit the copying service is not intended either to be promotional, as, indeed, petitioner charged a fee for the copies made.
Here, the service being rendered by private respondent was not a specific or special skill that Skillpower, Inc. was in the business of providing. 

(3) Private respondent was made to understand that he was an employee of Skillpower, Inc., and not of the client to which he was assigned. Garado signed a contract entitled Appointment as Contract Worker, in which it was stated that his status was that of a contract worker for a definite period from January 1, 1983 to June 30, 1983. As such, private respondents employment was considered temporary, to terminate automatically six (6) months afterwards, without necessity of any notice and without entitling private respondent to separation or termination pay. Therefore, the termination of the contract or any renewal or extension thereof did not entitle him to become an employee of the client and the latter was not under any obligation to appoint him as such, notwithstanding the total duration of the contract or any extension or renewal thereof.

(4) Two letters reveal the role which Fuji Xerox played in the dismissal of the private respondent. They dispel any doubt that Fuji Xerox exercised disciplinary authority over Garado and that Skillpower, Inc. issued the order of dismissal merely in obedience to the decision of petitioner.

(5) Petitioner Fuji Xerox argues that Skillpower, Inc. had typewriters and service vehicles for the conduct of its business independently of the petitioner. But typewriters and vehicles bear no direct relationship to the job for which Skillpower, Inc. contracted its service of operating copier machines and offering copying services to the public. The fact is that Skillpower, Inc. did not have copying machines of its own. What it did was simply to supply manpower to Fuji Xerox. The phrase substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business, in the Implementing Rules clearly contemplates tools, equipment, etc., which are directly related to the service it is being contracted to render. One who does not have an independent business for undertaking the job contracted for is just an agent of the employer.

Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

Law Labor Digest: PHILIPPINES TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al (G.R. No. 123891, Feb. 28, 2001)

Law Labor Digest: PHILIPPINES TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al 

(G.R. No. 123891, Feb. 28, 2001)

FACTS:

Private respondent, Carlos Nietes filed a complaint against Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. (PTC) for payment of disability benefit, sickness wages, refund of medical expenses and attorney’s fees. POEA Adjudication Office issued its decision in favor of the private respondent awarding disability benefit.

Petitioner admits that private respondent suffered illness which rendered him unfit for work. However, it points out that private respondent did not submit proof of the extent of his disability as required by Section C (4) [b] and [c] of the POEA Standard Contract for Seamen. Without this proof, petitioner argues that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the findings of the POEA Adjudication Office.

ISSUE:

Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming with modification, the judgment of the POEA Adjudication Office.

HELD: 

NO. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. 

In NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 486, 494 (1997), we said:

Strict rules of evidence, it must be remembered, are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits. Private respondent having substantially established the causative circumstances leading to his permanent total disability to have transpired during his employment, we find the NLRC to have acted in the exercise of its sound discretion in awarding permanent total disability benefits to private respondent. Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.

The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.

Petition is DISMISSED.

LABOR LAW DIGEST: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RHODELINE CASTILLON (G.R. No. 130940, April 21, 1999)

LABOR LAW DIGEST: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RHODELINE CASTILLON 

(G.R. No. 130940, April 21, 1999)

FACTS:

Rhodeline Castillon appeals the December 8, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, which convicted her of large-scale illegal recruitment and imposed upon her the penalty of life imprisonment plus a fine of P100,000.

In convicting appellant, the trial court found that the victims paid the appellant P4,000 each, because of her fraudulent representation that she could provide them employment abroad.

From the evidence of the prosecution, records show that Castillon solicited, canvassed and demanded payment from four complainants, the partial amount of P4,000.00, in consideration of a promised employment abroad, through the efforts and influence of herself. The records likewise showed that she herself took the initiative of going with complainant to Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, in order to receive from Emily and Nelia Perturbos the above-advance payments; while in the case of Acol and Bula-ag, she personally went to the[ir] parents . . . to make representations and assurances that she  would be responsible for providing employment for them abroad.

Castillon however denied and explained that she did not recruit complainants but she merely help[ed] them for humanitarian reason.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant guilty is beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.

HELD: 
YES. The prosecution evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the foregoing elements were present in this case.

Large-scale illegal recruitment has the following essential elements:

(1) The accused undertook [a] recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.

(2) He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.

(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. 

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as follows:

. . . [A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers [which] includes referrals, contact services, promises or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

There is no question that appellant did not have a license to engage in the recruitment of workers, as she herself admitted, and that the crime was committed against more than three persons. Appellant merely contends that she did not engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Her argument is belied, however, by the evidence on record.

The appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

Labor Law Digest: PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION v. HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al (G.R. No. L-63535, May 27, 1985)

Labor Law Digest: PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION v. HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al (G.R. No. L-63535, May 27, 1985) 

FACTS:

The case stems from a claim for disability compensation benefits and hospitalization expenses under employment contract, filed by private respondent  Brigido Samson, against the petitioner before the National Seaman's Board (NSB). A decision was rendered on by the Executive Director of the NSB, ordering petitioner to pay complainant the sum of US $3,800.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency as disability compensation benefits, among others. Not satisfied with the foregoing judgment, petitioner appealed to the NLRC. During the pendency of said appeal, petitioner offered P18,000.00 to private respondent. Private respondent received said amount and executed a "Release" document.

The appealed decision was affirmed by the NLRC. During the scheduled hearing, private respondent maintained that the P18,000.00 was accepted by him only as partial payment of the award since he badly needed the money for his on-going medical treatment. Petitioner herein, however, insisted that said amount constituted full payment of the award.

An Order was issued by the Board, and then the amended Writ of Execution was forthwith issued. Petitioner however, filed a motion to quash the amended writ of execution. The Board denied the said motion. Petitioner appealed the denial of its motion to NLRC. NLRC rendered a resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal. Hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the ordering payment of the award using the dollar standard, as affirmed by NLRC, is in violation of law.
b) Whether or not the payment of P18,000.00 under the document of release executed by private respondent constitutes full satisfaction of the award.

HELD:

a) NO. A careful reading of the decision rendered by the Executive Director of the NSB and which led to the Writ of Execution protested to by petitioner, will readily disclose that the award to the private respondent does not compel payment in dollar currency but in fact expressly allows payment of "its equivalent in Philippine currency. Moreover, the fixing of the award in dollars was based on the parties employment contract, stipulating wages and benefits in dollars since private respondent was engaged in an overseas seaman on board petitioner's foreign vessel. Thus, Republic Act No. 529 provision specifically making it unlawful to require payment of domestic obligations in foreign currency, is not applicable to the case at bar. 

b) NO. As held in the case of MRR Yard Crew Union versus Philippine National Railways, 72 SCRA 88 (1976), the fact that the employee "has signed a satisfaction receipt does not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than that the worker is entitled to recover."

Nonetheless, its worthnoting that despite the execution of said release document, the petitioner did not file any motion to dismiss its appeal or to have said appealed case declared terminated due to the alleged satisfaction of the judgment. This omission negates an inference that the parties had actually agreed that the payment of the P18,000.00 would be equivalent to a full satisfaction of the award and/or a waiver of the balance on the award.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

Labor Law Digest: NISSAN MOTORS PHILS., INC. v. VICTORINO ANGELO [G.R. No. 164181, September 14, 2011]

Topics: Just dismissal, Exceptional cases when awarding separation pay

NISSAN MOTORS PHILS., INC. v. VICTORINO ANGELO

[G.R. No. 164181, September 14, 2011]

Facts:

Victorino Angelo, a payroll staff of the respondent company, NISSAN, filed for  illegal  suspension  with  the  DOLE. Petitioner conducted an investigation and concluded that respondent's explanation was untrue and insufficient. Thus, petitioner issued a Notice of Termination.

Respondent amended his previous complaint against petitioner to include the

charge of illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. NLRC sustained. CA reversed directing reinstatement of Angelo and ordered  the company to pay him backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal.

Thus this petition.

Petitioner argues that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have been accorded respect by the CA as they are based on substantial evidence.  They claimed that the language used by respondent in his Letter­Explanation is akin to a manifest refusal to cooperate with company officers, and resorted to conduct which smacks of outright disrespect and willful defiance of authority or insubordination.

Issue:

1)         Was the termination just?

2)         Is a justly terminated employee entitled to separation pay?

Held:

1)         YES. The dismissal of respondent was legal or for a just cause based on substantial evidence presented by petitioner. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in labor cases, is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

The just causes enumerated in the Labor Code namely serious misconduct, willful disobedience and gross neglect were duly substantiated by the petitioner.

-           For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, 

(a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.

In this case, the letter-explanation was found to be grossly discourteous in content and tenor. Jurisprudence shows accusatory and inflammatory language used by an

employee to the employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or termination.

-           For the allegation of willful or intentional disobedience, there is just dismissal only where such rule, order or instruction is (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) connected with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.

The allegations can still be adduced and proven in the same Letter-­Explanation.

-           The allegation of gross negligence was also substantiated as shown in Angelo’s failure to turn over his functions to someone capable of performing the vital tasks which he could not effectively perform or undertake because of his heart ailment or condition.

2)         YES. By way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity. Although the dismissal was legal, respondent is still entitled to a separation pay as a measure of financial assistance, considering his length of service and his poor physical condition which was one of the reasons he filed a leave of absence.

Labor Law Digest: NIPPON HOUSING PHIL. INC. V. MAIAH ANGELA LEYNES [G.R. No. 177816, August 3, 2011]

NIPPON HOUSING PHIL. INC. V. MAIAH ANGELA LEYNES

[G.R. No. 177816, August 3, 2011]

Perez, J.

Facts:

Maiah Leynes was hired as Property Manager for respondent NHPI’s building maintenance business. She handled the project for their only client, Bay Gardens Condominium. She was also responsible for the hiring and deployment of manpower, salary and position determination as well as the assignment of the schedules and responsibilities of employees. In one incident, Leynes had a misunderstanding with Engr.  Cantuba, the Building Engineer assigned at the Project, regarding the extension of the latters working hours.  NHPIs Vice President went on to issue a memorandum, attributing the incident to simple personal differences and directing Leynes to allow Engr. Cantuba to report back for work.

Disappointed with the foregoing management decision,  Leynes  submitted  to  NHPIs President, a letter asking for an emergency leave of absence for the supposed purpose of coordinating with her lawyer regarding her resignation letter. While

NHPI offered the Property Manager position to Engr. Carlos Jose as a consequence Leynes signification of her intention to resign, it also appears that Leynes sent another letter to NHPI on the same day, expressing her intention to return to work on and to call off her planned resignation upon the advice of her lawyer. Leynes was constrained to send out a written protest regarding the verbal information she supposedly received from Reyes that a substitute has already been hired for her position. Leynes was further served by petitioner with a letter and memorandum relieving her from her position and directing her to report to NHPIs main office while she was on floating status.

Aggrieved, Leynes lost no time in filing against NHPI and its above­named officers the complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, benefits, damages and attorney’s fees docketed before the NLRC. She claimed that her being relieved from her position without just cause and replacement by one Carlos Jose amounted to an illegal dismissal from employment.

NHPI and its officers asserted that the management exercise of the prerogative to put an employee on floating status for a period not exceeding six months was justified in view of her threatened resignation from her position and BGCCs request for her replacement. 

During the pendency of the case, however, Reyes eventually served the DOLE Leynes with the 8 August 2002 notice terminating her services effective 22 August 2002, on the ground of redundancy or lack of a posting commensurate to her position at the Project.  Leynes was offered by NHPI the sum of P28,188.16 representing her unpaid wages, proportionate 13th month pay, tax refund and service incentive leave pay (SILP).

Issue:

1)         Whether or not placing an employee on floating status is tantamount to constructive dismissal.

2)         Was the complaint for illegal dismissal proper?

3)         Was the dismissal valid on the ground of redundancy?

4)         Was there a violation on the 30 day notice requirement?

5)         Was Leynes entitled to separation pay, and other monetary awards?

Held:

1)         NO. Acting on Leynes letter protesting against the hiring of her replacement and reiterating her lack of intention to resign from her position, the record, moreover, shows that NHPI simply placed her on floating status until such time that another project could be secured for her.

The rule is settled, however, that "off­detailing" is not equivalent to dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond a reasonable time and that it is only when such a "floating status" lasts for more  than  six  months  that  the  employee  may  be  considered  to  have  been  constructively dismissed.  

 In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is, concededly, charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action or the transfer of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity.

Article 286 of the Labor Code has been applied to other industries when, as a consequence of the bona  fide  suspension  of  the  operation  of  a  business  or  undertaking,  an  employer  is constrained to put employees on floating status for a period not exceeding six months.

2)         NO. A complaint for illegal dismissal filed prior to the lapse of said six­month and/or the actual dismissal of the employee is generally considered as prematurely filed.

3)         YES. With no other client aside from BGCC for the building management side of its business, we find that NHPI was acting well within its prerogatives when it eventually terminated Leynes services on  the  ground  of  redundancy.  One  of  the  recognized  authorized  causes  for  the termination of employment, redundancy exists when the service capability of the workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the business enterprise.

4)         YES. Where  dismissal  is  for  an  authorized  cause  like  redundancy,  the employer is, instead, required to serve a written notice of termination on the worker concerned and the DOLE, at least one month from the intended date thereof. Here, NHPI specifically made  Leynes  termination  from  service  effective  22  August  2002,  but  only  informed  said employee  of  the  same  on  8  August  2002 and  filed  with  the  DOLE  the  required Establishment Termination Report only on 16 August 2002.  For its failure to comply strictly with the 30­day minimum requirement for said notice and effectively violating Leynes right to due process, NHPI should be held liable to pay nominal damages in the sum of P50,000.00. The penalty should understandably be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer's exercise of its management prerogative.

5)         YES, AND NO. Having been validly terminated on the ground of redundancy, Leynes is entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service but not to the backwages adjudicated in her favor by the Labor Arbiter. For lack of showing of bad faith, malice or arbitrariness on the part of NHPI, there is, however, no justifiable ground for an award of moral and exemplary damages. For lack of factual or legal bases, we find no cause to award attorneys fees in favor of Leynes. In the absence of the same showing insofar as NHPIs corporate officers are concerned, neither is there cause to hold them jointly and severally liable for the monetary awards.

Petition granted.

Labor Law Digest: MARITIME FACTORS INC. V. BIENVENIDO HINDANG [G.R. No. 151993, October 19, 2011]

Topic: Exception to the rule on availing death benefits

MARITIME FACTORS INC. V. BIENVENIDO HINDANG

[G.R. No. 151993, October 19, 2011]

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic manning agency for sea vessel engaged the services of Danilo to work as GP/Deckhand effective for 12 months contract. However, while on board the vessel somewhere in Saudi Arabia, his body was found inside the locker of his cabin. Upon autopsy immediately after the death, the medical examiner of the Saudi police concluded that Danilo committed suicide by hanging himself. The body was repatriated to the Philippines.

Thereafter, Danilo’s brother filed for death compensation benefits against petitioner. Petitioner denied, contending they are not liable since the cause of Danilo’s death was suicide, hence, not compensable.

Labor Arbiter decided in favour of Danilo’s heirs. NLRC affirmed, CA sustained.

ISSUE:

If the employer is exempt from paying death compensation, when the employee has committed suicide.

RULING:

Yes. By way of an exception, the employer may be exempt from liability to the employee's heirs for death compensation benefits, if the employer can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. In this case, Maritime Factors was able to prove that Danilo's death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by committing suicide. Thus, the company does not need to pay for any death benefits to the employee’s heirs.

           

General rule - The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits.

Labor Law Digest: MARIO DIMAGAN V. DACWORKS UNITED INC. [G.R. No. 191053, November 28, 2011]

Topics: Constructive Dismissal, Abandonment, AWOL

MARIO DIMAGAN V. DACWORKS UNITED INC.

[G.R. No. 191053,    November 28, 2011]

Facts:

Dimagan, a stockholder of respondent company started working as an OIC therein. After sometime, he was relegated from the position of OIC to supervisor and subsequently to an ordinary technician. When he openly voiced out his concern, he was told not to report for work anymore. Dimagan then filed the complaint for illegal dismissal.

On the other hand, denying such allegation, the company asserted that Dimagan went on AWOL, violating company policy.  

The Labor Arbiter and NLRC found there was illegal dismissal. CA however found there was neither an illegal nor constructive dismissal.

ISSUE:

1)    Was there constructive dismissal of petitioner?

2)    Was there abandonment of employment by failing to report for work or having gone AWOL?

HELD:

1)    Yes. The reduction in petitioner's responsibilities and duties, particularly from supervisor to ordinary technician, constituted a demotion in rank tantamount to constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise.

2)    None. Petitioner’s failure to report for work was caused by the unwarranted demotion in rank that was imposed upon him by respondents, not by any intention to sever employment ties with them. And his filing of the instant complaint for illegal dismissal indubitably negates the allegation of abandonment.

For abandonment to exist, the operative act is still the employees’ ultimate act of putting an end to his employment. Thus, mere absence or failure to report for work is not tantamount to abandonment of work.

Labor Law Digest: JHORIZALDY UY V. CENTRO CERAMICA CORPORATION et al [G.R. No. 174631, October 19, 2011]

Topic: Illegal Dismissal, Backwages

JHORIZALDY UY V. CENTRO CERAMICA CORPORATION et al

 [G.R. No. 174631, October 19, 2011]

Facts:

Jhorizaldy Uy is a regular employee, working as a sales executive in respondent’s Centro Ceramica Corporation. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the company, its president and VP respectively. Petitioner alleged that he was dismissed without just cause by the company’s president when he refused to assume a new position in the marketing department. On the same day, the president, thru a closed door meeting, charged Uy of insubordination, terminated his services and was directed to turn over samples and files immediately. Petitioner returned the same and thereafter did not report to work. On the other hand, respondent company denied dismissing petitioner.

For his illegal termination, petitioner asserted that he is entitled to his unpaid commission, tax refund, back wages and reinstatement.

Labor Arbiter found no illegal dismissal finding petitioner voluntarily resigned. NLRC reversed the same. CA meantime reversed NLRC’s finding, stating that it was petitioner who informally severed the employment relationship.

Issues:

1)    If the employee was illegally dismissed or he voluntarily resigned.

2)    If the employee was entitled to reinstatement.

Ruling:

1)    He was illegally dismissed. The evidence on record suggests that petitioner did not resign; He was orally dismissed by Sy. It is this lack of clear, valid and legal cause, not to mention due process that made his dismissal illegal, warranting reinstatement and the award of back wages.

2)    Yes, he was entitled for reinstatement however the doctrine of strained relations applies here. Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay has been considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, computed from the time of his engagement by respondents on March 21, 1999 up to the finality of this decision.

Petitioner is likewise entitled to the payment of full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the date of his dismissal on February 19, 2002 up to the finality of this decision.

Labor Law Digest: AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS V. PROGRESIBONG UNYON [G.R. No. 160192, July 13, 2011]

Topic: In Pari Delicto in labor cases

AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS V. PROGRESIBONG UNYON

[G.R. No. 160192, July 13, 2011]

FACTS:

AER is an automotive engine repair company. Progresibong Unyon is the legitimate labor union of AER’s rank and file employees. Both parties filed a complaint against each other before the NLRC.

AER filed a complaint against Unyon and its 18 members for illegal concerted activities. It likewise suspended 7 union members tested positive for illegal drugs.  AER claims that Unyon was guilty of staging an illegal strike.  On the other hand, Unyon  filed  a counter charge  accusing  AER  of  unfair  labor  practice,  illegal  suspension  and  illegal dismissal. Unyon claims that AER committed an illegal lockout.

The dispute arose a day after the union filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE. At that time, AER required all its employees to undergo a compulsory drug test. Employees who were found positive for illegal drugs were suspended thereafter. In protest of the alleged illegal suspension, the complaining workers staged a one day walkout. Subsequently, AER dismissed concerned employees as penalty for the alleged illegal strike.

Likewise, AER had also pulled out machines from the main building to the AER-PSC compound located on another street. Consequently, protesting employees forced their way to the AER-PSC premises to try to bring out the boring machine.

On appeal, CA decided to order reinstatement of all suspended employees without back wages.

ISSUE:

Are both parties guilty of in pari delicto?

HELD:

Yes. Both AER and Unyon are at fault or in pari delicto, thus, they should be restored to their respective positions prior to the illegal strike and illegal lockout. Nonetheless, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, the concerned employees should be given separation pay up to the date set for the return of the complaining employees in lieu of reinstatement.

Petitions denied.

Labor Law Digest: JULIET APACIBLE V. MULTIMED INDUSTRIES INC. et. al. [G.R. No. 178903, May 30, 2011]

Topic: Separation Pay

LABOR LAW CASE: JULIET APACIBLE V. MULTIMED INDUSTRIES INC. et. al.

[G.R. No. 178903, May 30, 2011]

FACTS:

Juliet Apacible is an assistant area manager for Cebu operations of the respondent company, Multimed Industries. Due to the company’s reorganization, a transfer order was issued to Apacible from Cebu to the main office in Pasig, Manila however, she refused heeding the same. Through her counsel, she insisted remaining in her current position in Cebu, thus refusing to comply with the transfer order and demanded for payment of separation pay.

Finally, respondent company terminated Apacible for insubordination. This prompted Apacible to file a case for illegal dismissal, and nonpayment of separation pay, among others.

NLRC granted Apacible’s petition for separation pay by way of financial assistance. CA reversed.

ISSUE: 

If an employee is entitled to payment of separation way by way of financial assistance  in cases of valid dismissal due to gross insubordination.

HELD:

No, separation pay is not warranted when the employee was justly terminated for gross insubordination or willful disobedience. Apacible’s adamant refusal to transfer from Cebu to Manila shows she was guilty of gross insubordination, one of the four grounds laid down in Art. 282 of the Labor Code not granting award of separation pay.

Petition denied.

Evidence Digest: FRANCISCO BUNAG VS. COURT OF APPEALS (1988)

Topic: Authentication and Proof of Documents 

FRANCISCO BUNAG VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. L-39013,February 29,1988]

Facts:

This case is about the due execution and authenticity of a thumb-marked, non-notarized and non-witnessed deed of sale of a parcel of unregistered land. The trial court found that private respondents have failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale. 

The Court of Appeals, however, overturned the trial court's finding, relying on the testimony of Brigida Bautista, a sister of private respondents. In her testimony however, Brigida Bautista did not furnish any details surrounding the execution of the document.

Issue:

Was the unnotarized deed of sale, a private writing, can be received in evidence without proving its due execution and authenticity?

Held:

NO. Proof of the due execution and authenticity of private writings is required under Section 21, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. — Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or

(c) By a subscribing witness.


It should be noted that (Exhibit "1") was written in English. Since it appears that said document was merely thumb-marked, it could reasonably be inferred that Apolonio Bunag, the supposed vendor, was illiterate. Under the stances, the minimum proof necessary to establish due authenticity should, in the least, include evidence that the document was duly read, explained and translated to Apolonio Bunag. Unfortunately, no such evidence was presented. 


The probative value of the testimony of Brigida Bautista, it is not sufficient if he states in a general manner that such person made the writing. More so if the document was merely thumb-marked.

Another fact which compels this Court to proceed with caution is the fact that there are no instrumental witnesses in the document. The mischief that lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumb-marked. without any witnesses to it, and not acknowledged before a notary public could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules on evidence that a private writing must be shown to be duly executed and authenticated.

The due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale, (Exhibit 1) not having been satisfactorily proven, such private document should be excluded. 

Evidence Digest: THE UNITED STATES, vs.VALENTIN TRONO, ET AL. (1904)

Topic: Opinion Rule (Rule 130, Sections 48-50)

THE UNITED STATES, vs.VALENTIN TRONO, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 1344, January 19, 1904]

Facts:

The defendants, charged with the murder of Benito Perez, were convicted by the trial court of the offense of lesiones menos graves. It appears that Benito Perez was arrested by police officers who allegedly illtreated Benito, causing the latter's death.

The defense contends that the death of Benito Perez was not due to the wounds inflicted, which were not serious, but to hepatic colic brought on by hypertrophic cirrhosis, from which the deceased had been suffering for a long time, basing such allegation on the certificate and testimony of the physician, Don Andres Icasiano, wherein such a statement is made.

There is nothing in the case to show that the deceased had ever suffered from hypertrophic cirrhosis. The ailment which the deceased had at the time referred to by the physician, Icasiano, was cholera, according to the mother of the deceased, Candelaria de los Santos, who testified, besides, referring to the time to which this case refers, that her son was of a robust constitution and sufferred no ailments whatever.

The medical certificate stated that the body of the deceased only showed two small bruises while three witnesses testified that the deceased had bruises and swellings on the superior part of the left hand, on the neck, on the ribs, and on the abdomen; The physician also affirmed that the deceased devoted himself on the night of the occurrence to his customary libations. Nothing is shown in the case to corroborate this illegal habit, and especially nobody testified to having seen the deceased drunk on the night of the occurrence. 

Also, after the physician, Icasiano, had examined the deceased, and while the latter was still alive, he told Raymunda Perez that the deceased was suffering from blows with a rifle.

When the death had taken place, the family of the deceased repeatedly requested the physician, Icasiano, to examine the body, which the latter flatly refused to do, and warned them, on the other hand, to bury him quickly, under the pretext that he had died of cholera. It likewise appears from the testimony of Raymunda Perez that said physician is an intimate friend of the accused, Maximo Angeles.

Issue:

Is the expert testimony of the physician admissible in evidence?

Held:

NO. The  physician's testimony cannot be given credit because the facts which would serve as a foundation to his conclusion are manifestly inexact. In the present case there are to be found sufficient data which show in a conclusive manner the seriousness of the wounds inflicted upon the deceased, which from the very first moment prevented him from keeping on his feet, and caused him continuous and sharp pains in the abdomen and retention of the urine — symptoms which constantly showed themselves until death came — which in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary may be attributed to these causes, which undoubtedly were sufficient in themselves to bring about the death of the deceased.

Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on questions of a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weight them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial.