Labor Law Digest: NISSAN MOTORS PHILS., INC. v. VICTORINO ANGELO [G.R. No. 164181, September 14, 2011]

Topics: Just dismissal, Exceptional cases when awarding separation pay

NISSAN MOTORS PHILS., INC. v. VICTORINO ANGELO

[G.R. No. 164181, September 14, 2011]

Facts:

Victorino Angelo, a payroll staff of the respondent company, NISSAN, filed for  illegal  suspension  with  the  DOLE. Petitioner conducted an investigation and concluded that respondent's explanation was untrue and insufficient. Thus, petitioner issued a Notice of Termination.

Respondent amended his previous complaint against petitioner to include the

charge of illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. NLRC sustained. CA reversed directing reinstatement of Angelo and ordered  the company to pay him backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal.

Thus this petition.

Petitioner argues that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have been accorded respect by the CA as they are based on substantial evidence.  They claimed that the language used by respondent in his Letter­Explanation is akin to a manifest refusal to cooperate with company officers, and resorted to conduct which smacks of outright disrespect and willful defiance of authority or insubordination.

Issue:

1)         Was the termination just?

2)         Is a justly terminated employee entitled to separation pay?

Held:

1)         YES. The dismissal of respondent was legal or for a just cause based on substantial evidence presented by petitioner. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in labor cases, is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

The just causes enumerated in the Labor Code namely serious misconduct, willful disobedience and gross neglect were duly substantiated by the petitioner.

-           For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, 

(a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.

In this case, the letter-explanation was found to be grossly discourteous in content and tenor. Jurisprudence shows accusatory and inflammatory language used by an

employee to the employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or termination.

-           For the allegation of willful or intentional disobedience, there is just dismissal only where such rule, order or instruction is (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) connected with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.

The allegations can still be adduced and proven in the same Letter-­Explanation.

-           The allegation of gross negligence was also substantiated as shown in Angelo’s failure to turn over his functions to someone capable of performing the vital tasks which he could not effectively perform or undertake because of his heart ailment or condition.

2)         YES. By way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity. Although the dismissal was legal, respondent is still entitled to a separation pay as a measure of financial assistance, considering his length of service and his poor physical condition which was one of the reasons he filed a leave of absence.

Labor Law Digest: NIPPON HOUSING PHIL. INC. V. MAIAH ANGELA LEYNES [G.R. No. 177816, August 3, 2011]

NIPPON HOUSING PHIL. INC. V. MAIAH ANGELA LEYNES

[G.R. No. 177816, August 3, 2011]

Perez, J.

Facts:

Maiah Leynes was hired as Property Manager for respondent NHPI’s building maintenance business. She handled the project for their only client, Bay Gardens Condominium. She was also responsible for the hiring and deployment of manpower, salary and position determination as well as the assignment of the schedules and responsibilities of employees. In one incident, Leynes had a misunderstanding with Engr.  Cantuba, the Building Engineer assigned at the Project, regarding the extension of the latters working hours.  NHPIs Vice President went on to issue a memorandum, attributing the incident to simple personal differences and directing Leynes to allow Engr. Cantuba to report back for work.

Disappointed with the foregoing management decision,  Leynes  submitted  to  NHPIs President, a letter asking for an emergency leave of absence for the supposed purpose of coordinating with her lawyer regarding her resignation letter. While

NHPI offered the Property Manager position to Engr. Carlos Jose as a consequence Leynes signification of her intention to resign, it also appears that Leynes sent another letter to NHPI on the same day, expressing her intention to return to work on and to call off her planned resignation upon the advice of her lawyer. Leynes was constrained to send out a written protest regarding the verbal information she supposedly received from Reyes that a substitute has already been hired for her position. Leynes was further served by petitioner with a letter and memorandum relieving her from her position and directing her to report to NHPIs main office while she was on floating status.

Aggrieved, Leynes lost no time in filing against NHPI and its above­named officers the complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, benefits, damages and attorney’s fees docketed before the NLRC. She claimed that her being relieved from her position without just cause and replacement by one Carlos Jose amounted to an illegal dismissal from employment.

NHPI and its officers asserted that the management exercise of the prerogative to put an employee on floating status for a period not exceeding six months was justified in view of her threatened resignation from her position and BGCCs request for her replacement. 

During the pendency of the case, however, Reyes eventually served the DOLE Leynes with the 8 August 2002 notice terminating her services effective 22 August 2002, on the ground of redundancy or lack of a posting commensurate to her position at the Project.  Leynes was offered by NHPI the sum of P28,188.16 representing her unpaid wages, proportionate 13th month pay, tax refund and service incentive leave pay (SILP).

Issue:

1)         Whether or not placing an employee on floating status is tantamount to constructive dismissal.

2)         Was the complaint for illegal dismissal proper?

3)         Was the dismissal valid on the ground of redundancy?

4)         Was there a violation on the 30 day notice requirement?

5)         Was Leynes entitled to separation pay, and other monetary awards?

Held:

1)         NO. Acting on Leynes letter protesting against the hiring of her replacement and reiterating her lack of intention to resign from her position, the record, moreover, shows that NHPI simply placed her on floating status until such time that another project could be secured for her.

The rule is settled, however, that "off­detailing" is not equivalent to dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond a reasonable time and that it is only when such a "floating status" lasts for more  than  six  months  that  the  employee  may  be  considered  to  have  been  constructively dismissed.  

 In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is, concededly, charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action or the transfer of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity.

Article 286 of the Labor Code has been applied to other industries when, as a consequence of the bona  fide  suspension  of  the  operation  of  a  business  or  undertaking,  an  employer  is constrained to put employees on floating status for a period not exceeding six months.

2)         NO. A complaint for illegal dismissal filed prior to the lapse of said six­month and/or the actual dismissal of the employee is generally considered as prematurely filed.

3)         YES. With no other client aside from BGCC for the building management side of its business, we find that NHPI was acting well within its prerogatives when it eventually terminated Leynes services on  the  ground  of  redundancy.  One  of  the  recognized  authorized  causes  for  the termination of employment, redundancy exists when the service capability of the workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the business enterprise.

4)         YES. Where  dismissal  is  for  an  authorized  cause  like  redundancy,  the employer is, instead, required to serve a written notice of termination on the worker concerned and the DOLE, at least one month from the intended date thereof. Here, NHPI specifically made  Leynes  termination  from  service  effective  22  August  2002,  but  only  informed  said employee  of  the  same  on  8  August  2002 and  filed  with  the  DOLE  the  required Establishment Termination Report only on 16 August 2002.  For its failure to comply strictly with the 30­day minimum requirement for said notice and effectively violating Leynes right to due process, NHPI should be held liable to pay nominal damages in the sum of P50,000.00. The penalty should understandably be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer's exercise of its management prerogative.

5)         YES, AND NO. Having been validly terminated on the ground of redundancy, Leynes is entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service but not to the backwages adjudicated in her favor by the Labor Arbiter. For lack of showing of bad faith, malice or arbitrariness on the part of NHPI, there is, however, no justifiable ground for an award of moral and exemplary damages. For lack of factual or legal bases, we find no cause to award attorneys fees in favor of Leynes. In the absence of the same showing insofar as NHPIs corporate officers are concerned, neither is there cause to hold them jointly and severally liable for the monetary awards.

Petition granted.

Labor Law Digest: MARITIME FACTORS INC. V. BIENVENIDO HINDANG [G.R. No. 151993, October 19, 2011]

Topic: Exception to the rule on availing death benefits

MARITIME FACTORS INC. V. BIENVENIDO HINDANG

[G.R. No. 151993, October 19, 2011]

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic manning agency for sea vessel engaged the services of Danilo to work as GP/Deckhand effective for 12 months contract. However, while on board the vessel somewhere in Saudi Arabia, his body was found inside the locker of his cabin. Upon autopsy immediately after the death, the medical examiner of the Saudi police concluded that Danilo committed suicide by hanging himself. The body was repatriated to the Philippines.

Thereafter, Danilo’s brother filed for death compensation benefits against petitioner. Petitioner denied, contending they are not liable since the cause of Danilo’s death was suicide, hence, not compensable.

Labor Arbiter decided in favour of Danilo’s heirs. NLRC affirmed, CA sustained.

ISSUE:

If the employer is exempt from paying death compensation, when the employee has committed suicide.

RULING:

Yes. By way of an exception, the employer may be exempt from liability to the employee's heirs for death compensation benefits, if the employer can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. In this case, Maritime Factors was able to prove that Danilo's death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by committing suicide. Thus, the company does not need to pay for any death benefits to the employee’s heirs.

           

General rule - The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits.

Labor Law Digest: MARIO DIMAGAN V. DACWORKS UNITED INC. [G.R. No. 191053, November 28, 2011]

Topics: Constructive Dismissal, Abandonment, AWOL

MARIO DIMAGAN V. DACWORKS UNITED INC.

[G.R. No. 191053,    November 28, 2011]

Facts:

Dimagan, a stockholder of respondent company started working as an OIC therein. After sometime, he was relegated from the position of OIC to supervisor and subsequently to an ordinary technician. When he openly voiced out his concern, he was told not to report for work anymore. Dimagan then filed the complaint for illegal dismissal.

On the other hand, denying such allegation, the company asserted that Dimagan went on AWOL, violating company policy.  

The Labor Arbiter and NLRC found there was illegal dismissal. CA however found there was neither an illegal nor constructive dismissal.

ISSUE:

1)    Was there constructive dismissal of petitioner?

2)    Was there abandonment of employment by failing to report for work or having gone AWOL?

HELD:

1)    Yes. The reduction in petitioner's responsibilities and duties, particularly from supervisor to ordinary technician, constituted a demotion in rank tantamount to constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise.

2)    None. Petitioner’s failure to report for work was caused by the unwarranted demotion in rank that was imposed upon him by respondents, not by any intention to sever employment ties with them. And his filing of the instant complaint for illegal dismissal indubitably negates the allegation of abandonment.

For abandonment to exist, the operative act is still the employees’ ultimate act of putting an end to his employment. Thus, mere absence or failure to report for work is not tantamount to abandonment of work.

Labor Law Digest: JHORIZALDY UY V. CENTRO CERAMICA CORPORATION et al [G.R. No. 174631, October 19, 2011]

Topic: Illegal Dismissal, Backwages

JHORIZALDY UY V. CENTRO CERAMICA CORPORATION et al

 [G.R. No. 174631, October 19, 2011]

Facts:

Jhorizaldy Uy is a regular employee, working as a sales executive in respondent’s Centro Ceramica Corporation. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the company, its president and VP respectively. Petitioner alleged that he was dismissed without just cause by the company’s president when he refused to assume a new position in the marketing department. On the same day, the president, thru a closed door meeting, charged Uy of insubordination, terminated his services and was directed to turn over samples and files immediately. Petitioner returned the same and thereafter did not report to work. On the other hand, respondent company denied dismissing petitioner.

For his illegal termination, petitioner asserted that he is entitled to his unpaid commission, tax refund, back wages and reinstatement.

Labor Arbiter found no illegal dismissal finding petitioner voluntarily resigned. NLRC reversed the same. CA meantime reversed NLRC’s finding, stating that it was petitioner who informally severed the employment relationship.

Issues:

1)    If the employee was illegally dismissed or he voluntarily resigned.

2)    If the employee was entitled to reinstatement.

Ruling:

1)    He was illegally dismissed. The evidence on record suggests that petitioner did not resign; He was orally dismissed by Sy. It is this lack of clear, valid and legal cause, not to mention due process that made his dismissal illegal, warranting reinstatement and the award of back wages.

2)    Yes, he was entitled for reinstatement however the doctrine of strained relations applies here. Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay has been considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, computed from the time of his engagement by respondents on March 21, 1999 up to the finality of this decision.

Petitioner is likewise entitled to the payment of full back wages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the date of his dismissal on February 19, 2002 up to the finality of this decision.

Labor Law Digest: AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS V. PROGRESIBONG UNYON [G.R. No. 160192, July 13, 2011]

Topic: In Pari Delicto in labor cases

AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE REBUILDERS V. PROGRESIBONG UNYON

[G.R. No. 160192, July 13, 2011]

FACTS:

AER is an automotive engine repair company. Progresibong Unyon is the legitimate labor union of AER’s rank and file employees. Both parties filed a complaint against each other before the NLRC.

AER filed a complaint against Unyon and its 18 members for illegal concerted activities. It likewise suspended 7 union members tested positive for illegal drugs.  AER claims that Unyon was guilty of staging an illegal strike.  On the other hand, Unyon  filed  a counter charge  accusing  AER  of  unfair  labor  practice,  illegal  suspension  and  illegal dismissal. Unyon claims that AER committed an illegal lockout.

The dispute arose a day after the union filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE. At that time, AER required all its employees to undergo a compulsory drug test. Employees who were found positive for illegal drugs were suspended thereafter. In protest of the alleged illegal suspension, the complaining workers staged a one day walkout. Subsequently, AER dismissed concerned employees as penalty for the alleged illegal strike.

Likewise, AER had also pulled out machines from the main building to the AER-PSC compound located on another street. Consequently, protesting employees forced their way to the AER-PSC premises to try to bring out the boring machine.

On appeal, CA decided to order reinstatement of all suspended employees without back wages.

ISSUE:

Are both parties guilty of in pari delicto?

HELD:

Yes. Both AER and Unyon are at fault or in pari delicto, thus, they should be restored to their respective positions prior to the illegal strike and illegal lockout. Nonetheless, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, the concerned employees should be given separation pay up to the date set for the return of the complaining employees in lieu of reinstatement.

Petitions denied.

Labor Law Digest: JULIET APACIBLE V. MULTIMED INDUSTRIES INC. et. al. [G.R. No. 178903, May 30, 2011]

Topic: Separation Pay

LABOR LAW CASE: JULIET APACIBLE V. MULTIMED INDUSTRIES INC. et. al.

[G.R. No. 178903, May 30, 2011]

FACTS:

Juliet Apacible is an assistant area manager for Cebu operations of the respondent company, Multimed Industries. Due to the company’s reorganization, a transfer order was issued to Apacible from Cebu to the main office in Pasig, Manila however, she refused heeding the same. Through her counsel, she insisted remaining in her current position in Cebu, thus refusing to comply with the transfer order and demanded for payment of separation pay.

Finally, respondent company terminated Apacible for insubordination. This prompted Apacible to file a case for illegal dismissal, and nonpayment of separation pay, among others.

NLRC granted Apacible’s petition for separation pay by way of financial assistance. CA reversed.

ISSUE: 

If an employee is entitled to payment of separation way by way of financial assistance  in cases of valid dismissal due to gross insubordination.

HELD:

No, separation pay is not warranted when the employee was justly terminated for gross insubordination or willful disobedience. Apacible’s adamant refusal to transfer from Cebu to Manila shows she was guilty of gross insubordination, one of the four grounds laid down in Art. 282 of the Labor Code not granting award of separation pay.

Petition denied.