Labor Law Case Digest: HSBC v. NLRC, et al [G.R. No. 116542. July 30, 1996]

HSBC v. NLRC [G.R. No. 116542. July 30, 1996]

Facts:

Complainant is a regular rank and file employee of  HSBC in Makati City. It appears that on February 3, 1993, complainant called the bank to inform the latter that he had an upset stomach and would not be able to report for work. His superior, however, requested him to report for work because the department he was then in was undermanned but complainant insisted that it was impossible for him to report for work, hence, he was allowed to go on sick leave on that day.

On February 4, 1993 the bank called up Dr. Logos to verify the truth of complainants statement but the doctor denied that he examined or attended to complainant on February 3, 1993 and the last time complainant consulted him was in December 1992. For this reason, the bank directed complainant to explain his acts of dishonesty because allegedly he was not honest in telling the bank that he had an upset stomach on February 3, 1993, and that he consulted Dr. Logos on that day.

Complainant, in his written statement, further admitted that his statement about his not staying at his house for one week and his consulting a doctor was incorrect, but that the same was not given with malicious intention or deceit or meant to commit fraud against the bank, its operations, customers and employees. 

However, on February 16, 1993, the bank came out with a memorandum terminating his services effective March 16, 1993 pursuant to Article 13, Section VI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the union of the rank and file employees of the bank and the company and the banks Code of Conduct.

Petitioner insists that private respondent should be dismissed in accordance with rules contained in its employees handbook stating that any form of dishonesty shall constitute serious offenses calling for termination.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not private respondents act of making a false statement as to the real reason for his absence on did not constitute such dishonesty as would warrant his termination from service.

(2) Whether or not NLRC arbitrarily imposed its value judgment and standard on petitioners disciplinary rules, thereby unilaterally restricting the Banks power and prerogative to discipline its employees according to reasonable rules and regulations

Held:

(1) YES. It is unarguable that private respondents false information concerning his whereabouts on February 3, 1993 is not a fraud, nor a false entry in the books of the bank; neither is it a failure to turn over clients funds, or theft or use of company assets, or anything analogous as to constitute a serious offense meriting the extreme penalty of dismissal.

Under Art. 282 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

None of the above apply in the instant case. To be lawful, the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.

(2)  NO. It is the NLRC's right and duty to review employers exercise of their prerogative to dismiss so as to prevent abuse and arbitrariness as granted under Arts. 217 and 218 of the Labor Code. The employers prerogative and power to discipline and terminate an employees services may not be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner as to erode or render meaningless the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and due process. Our labor laws, both substantive and procedural, require strict compliance before an employee may be dismissed.

Petition DISMISSED.

Labor Law Digest: PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX CORPORATION, et al v. NLRC et al [G.R. No. 111501. March 5, 1996]

PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX CORPORATION, et al v. NLRC et al 
[G.R. No. 111501. March 5, 1996]

Facts:
Fuji Xerox entered into an agreement under which Skillpower, Inc. supplied workers to operate copier machines of Fuji Xerox as part of the latters Xerox Copier Project in its sales offices. Private respondent Pedro Garado was assigned as key operator at Fuji Xerox branch at Buendia, Makati  in February of 1980.

In February of 1983, Garado went on leave and his place was taken over by a substitute. Upon his return in March, he discovered that there was a spoilage of over 600 copies. Afraid that he might be blamed for the spoilage, he tried to talk to a service technician of Fuji Xerox into stopping the meter of the machine.

The technician refused Garados request, but this incident came to the knowledge of Fuji Xerox which, on May 31, 1983, reported the matter to Skillpower, Inc. The next day, Skillpower, Inc. wrote Garado, ordering him to explain. In the meantime, it suspended him from work. Garado filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter held in a decision rendered on October 30, 1986 that Garado was an employee of Skillpower, Inc., and that he had merely been assigned by Skillpower, Inc. to Fuji Xerox. Hence, the dismissal.

On the other hand, the NLRC found Garado to be in fact an employee of petitioner Fuji Xerox and by it to have been illegally dismissed.

Hence the present petition. Fuji Xerox argues that Skillpower, Inc. is an independent contractor and that Garado is its employee for the following reasons:

(1) Garado was recruited by Skillpower, Inc.;

(2) The work done by Garado was not necessary to the conduct of the business of Fuji Xerox;

(3) Garados salaries and benefits were paid directly by Skillpower, Inc.;

(4) Garado worked under the control of Skillpower, Inc.; and

(5) Skillpower, Inc. is a highly-capitalized business venture.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Skillpower Inc. is an independent contractor and Garado was its employee?

HELD:
NO. Skillpower is a labor-only contractor and Garado is not its employee, based on the following findings:

(1) Garado was recruited by Skillpower, Inc. solely for assignment to Fuji Xerox to work in the latters Xerox Copier Project. When Garado was first assigned to work at Fuji Xerox, he had never been assigned to any other company so much so that by 1984, he was already a member of the union which petitioned the company for his regularization.

(2) The Xerox Copier Project of petitioners promotes goodwill for the company. It may not generate income for the company but there are activities which a company may find necessary to engage in because they ultimately redound to its benefit. Operating the company's copiers at its branches advertises the quality of their products and promotes the company's reputation and public image. It also advertises the utility and convenience of having a copier machine. It is noteworthy that while not operated for profit the copying service is not intended either to be promotional, as, indeed, petitioner charged a fee for the copies made.
Here, the service being rendered by private respondent was not a specific or special skill that Skillpower, Inc. was in the business of providing. 

(3) Private respondent was made to understand that he was an employee of Skillpower, Inc., and not of the client to which he was assigned. Garado signed a contract entitled Appointment as Contract Worker, in which it was stated that his status was that of a contract worker for a definite period from January 1, 1983 to June 30, 1983. As such, private respondents employment was considered temporary, to terminate automatically six (6) months afterwards, without necessity of any notice and without entitling private respondent to separation or termination pay. Therefore, the termination of the contract or any renewal or extension thereof did not entitle him to become an employee of the client and the latter was not under any obligation to appoint him as such, notwithstanding the total duration of the contract or any extension or renewal thereof.

(4) Two letters reveal the role which Fuji Xerox played in the dismissal of the private respondent. They dispel any doubt that Fuji Xerox exercised disciplinary authority over Garado and that Skillpower, Inc. issued the order of dismissal merely in obedience to the decision of petitioner.

(5) Petitioner Fuji Xerox argues that Skillpower, Inc. had typewriters and service vehicles for the conduct of its business independently of the petitioner. But typewriters and vehicles bear no direct relationship to the job for which Skillpower, Inc. contracted its service of operating copier machines and offering copying services to the public. The fact is that Skillpower, Inc. did not have copying machines of its own. What it did was simply to supply manpower to Fuji Xerox. The phrase substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business, in the Implementing Rules clearly contemplates tools, equipment, etc., which are directly related to the service it is being contracted to render. One who does not have an independent business for undertaking the job contracted for is just an agent of the employer.

Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

Law Labor Digest: PHILIPPINES TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al (G.R. No. 123891, Feb. 28, 2001)

Law Labor Digest: PHILIPPINES TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al 

(G.R. No. 123891, Feb. 28, 2001)

FACTS:

Private respondent, Carlos Nietes filed a complaint against Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. (PTC) for payment of disability benefit, sickness wages, refund of medical expenses and attorney’s fees. POEA Adjudication Office issued its decision in favor of the private respondent awarding disability benefit.

Petitioner admits that private respondent suffered illness which rendered him unfit for work. However, it points out that private respondent did not submit proof of the extent of his disability as required by Section C (4) [b] and [c] of the POEA Standard Contract for Seamen. Without this proof, petitioner argues that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the findings of the POEA Adjudication Office.

ISSUE:

Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming with modification, the judgment of the POEA Adjudication Office.

HELD: 

NO. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. 

In NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 486, 494 (1997), we said:

Strict rules of evidence, it must be remembered, are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits. Private respondent having substantially established the causative circumstances leading to his permanent total disability to have transpired during his employment, we find the NLRC to have acted in the exercise of its sound discretion in awarding permanent total disability benefits to private respondent. Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.

The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.

Petition is DISMISSED.

LABOR LAW DIGEST: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RHODELINE CASTILLON (G.R. No. 130940, April 21, 1999)

LABOR LAW DIGEST: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RHODELINE CASTILLON 

(G.R. No. 130940, April 21, 1999)

FACTS:

Rhodeline Castillon appeals the December 8, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, which convicted her of large-scale illegal recruitment and imposed upon her the penalty of life imprisonment plus a fine of P100,000.

In convicting appellant, the trial court found that the victims paid the appellant P4,000 each, because of her fraudulent representation that she could provide them employment abroad.

From the evidence of the prosecution, records show that Castillon solicited, canvassed and demanded payment from four complainants, the partial amount of P4,000.00, in consideration of a promised employment abroad, through the efforts and influence of herself. The records likewise showed that she herself took the initiative of going with complainant to Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, in order to receive from Emily and Nelia Perturbos the above-advance payments; while in the case of Acol and Bula-ag, she personally went to the[ir] parents . . . to make representations and assurances that she  would be responsible for providing employment for them abroad.

Castillon however denied and explained that she did not recruit complainants but she merely help[ed] them for humanitarian reason.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant guilty is beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.

HELD: 
YES. The prosecution evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the foregoing elements were present in this case.

Large-scale illegal recruitment has the following essential elements:

(1) The accused undertook [a] recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.

(2) He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.

(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. 

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as follows:

. . . [A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers [which] includes referrals, contact services, promises or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

There is no question that appellant did not have a license to engage in the recruitment of workers, as she herself admitted, and that the crime was committed against more than three persons. Appellant merely contends that she did not engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Her argument is belied, however, by the evidence on record.

The appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

Labor Law Digest: PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION v. HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al (G.R. No. L-63535, May 27, 1985)

Labor Law Digest: PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION v. HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al (G.R. No. L-63535, May 27, 1985) 

FACTS:

The case stems from a claim for disability compensation benefits and hospitalization expenses under employment contract, filed by private respondent  Brigido Samson, against the petitioner before the National Seaman's Board (NSB). A decision was rendered on by the Executive Director of the NSB, ordering petitioner to pay complainant the sum of US $3,800.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency as disability compensation benefits, among others. Not satisfied with the foregoing judgment, petitioner appealed to the NLRC. During the pendency of said appeal, petitioner offered P18,000.00 to private respondent. Private respondent received said amount and executed a "Release" document.

The appealed decision was affirmed by the NLRC. During the scheduled hearing, private respondent maintained that the P18,000.00 was accepted by him only as partial payment of the award since he badly needed the money for his on-going medical treatment. Petitioner herein, however, insisted that said amount constituted full payment of the award.

An Order was issued by the Board, and then the amended Writ of Execution was forthwith issued. Petitioner however, filed a motion to quash the amended writ of execution. The Board denied the said motion. Petitioner appealed the denial of its motion to NLRC. NLRC rendered a resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal. Hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the ordering payment of the award using the dollar standard, as affirmed by NLRC, is in violation of law.
b) Whether or not the payment of P18,000.00 under the document of release executed by private respondent constitutes full satisfaction of the award.

HELD:

a) NO. A careful reading of the decision rendered by the Executive Director of the NSB and which led to the Writ of Execution protested to by petitioner, will readily disclose that the award to the private respondent does not compel payment in dollar currency but in fact expressly allows payment of "its equivalent in Philippine currency. Moreover, the fixing of the award in dollars was based on the parties employment contract, stipulating wages and benefits in dollars since private respondent was engaged in an overseas seaman on board petitioner's foreign vessel. Thus, Republic Act No. 529 provision specifically making it unlawful to require payment of domestic obligations in foreign currency, is not applicable to the case at bar. 

b) NO. As held in the case of MRR Yard Crew Union versus Philippine National Railways, 72 SCRA 88 (1976), the fact that the employee "has signed a satisfaction receipt does not result in waiver; the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than that the worker is entitled to recover."

Nonetheless, its worthnoting that despite the execution of said release document, the petitioner did not file any motion to dismiss its appeal or to have said appealed case declared terminated due to the alleged satisfaction of the judgment. This omission negates an inference that the parties had actually agreed that the payment of the P18,000.00 would be equivalent to a full satisfaction of the award and/or a waiver of the balance on the award.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.