[G.R. No. L-27811. November 17, 1967] LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. vs. JOSE PAÑO

[G.R. No. L-27811. November 17, 1967] LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,  vs.JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera for plaintiff-appellant.
Victorio Advincula for defendant Jose Paño.
Office of the Solicitor General for defendant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Executive Secretary.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The question — May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — yielded an affirmative answer from the lower court.¹

Hence, this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the provisions of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

The undisputed controlling facts are:

In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao.

On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff.

On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land.

On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants² applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.

On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application.

The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.

On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.

The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.

On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." It may be well to state, at this point, that the decision just mentioned, signed by the Executive Secretary, was planted upon the facts as found in said decision.

Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.

And now subject of this appeal is the judgment of the court a quo dismissing plaintiff's case.

1. Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept there is that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff's trenchment claim is that this statute is controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President.

Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.³ So, too, is his control of all executive departments.⁴ Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.

Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office of the President.⁵ This Court has recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President's appeal.⁶ In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative remedies.⁷

Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments.⁸ And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."⁹

This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department secretary.

2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person.¹⁰ Not as correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person.¹¹ Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.¹²

3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher than anyone of them. From this, plaintiff carves the argument that one department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department secretary. This argument betrays lack of appreciation of the fact that where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"¹³ that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.¹⁴ No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.

For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff.

So ordered.

Source: lawphil,net